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ABSTRACT
I
I ABSTRACT
The growing digitalization of recent decades and the ease with which we can connect to others on the 
web has resulted in many forms of civil activism which appear hardly conceivable without it. 
Ironically, one of the most profound of these manifestations has been in its defense. In 2012, a 
European public went online and took to the streets to demonstrate, ultimately successfully, against the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). An international trade agreement intended to establish a 
minimum standard for copyright protection among members many feared it would facilitate online 
surveillance and censorship. The surrounding debate had many lasting effects yet also stands as an 
example of prejudiced allegations and subjective debate. This is seldom criticized because it developed 
the excitement of a mass movement for the short time of its existence. Almost a year later however, one 
has to wonder: What was actually achieved? 
Utilizing a poststructuralist discourse analysis, this thesis will investigate the development, 
composition and impact of the ACTA debate in Europe. Following Foucault's reasoning that discourses 
establish facts which tend to inform subsequent decision-making processes, it will be shown that this 
discussion was split in focus. Its division between the specific legislative proposal and the principal of 
copyrights roughly corresponded to the distinction between expert and public discourses whose 
reciprocal influence will also be considered. Comparatively analyzing two major daily newspapers 
each of two major Member States (i.e. Germany and the UK) will showcase how the public discourse 
developed. A subsequent analysis of the expert discourse, based on a number of interviews conducted 
with Brussels based authorities, will chronicle this development from an institutional point of view. 
Based on these findings, the protests against ACTA will be critically evaluated. It will be argued that 
they failed to realize an existing potential to have a more profound impact beyond the rejection of the 
specific agreement. The point being that no viable alternatives in ACTA’s place had been suggested, 
thus increasing the likelihood of similar advances to reemerge in the future. Despite the justified 
concerns regarding the agreement, protesting alone will not automatically result in better policies. After 
all, effective political decision making requires effort from both sides: political experts and the public. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
The case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was unique in many ways. It was the 
first time the European Parliament (EP) exerted some of its newly gained authority under the Lisbon 
Treaty to veto a legislative proposal by the European Commission (EC) already signed by the Council 
of the European Union (Council). The surrounding debate motivated the temporary manifestation of a 
European public, which coordinated Europe-wide protests against ACTA. It introduced the internet 
community and net policy to the mainstream and initiated a principal debate on the viability of 
contemporary copyright legislation and democratic transparency. (Knop, 2012(b)) While it touched 
upon a number of topics, the discourse on ACTA was also at times ill-informed, greatly diminished its 
overall quality. (Heidtmann, 2012) Nevertheless, under the impression of mass protests against the 
agreement, politicians started to call for additional reviews or even recalled their signatures. Critics of 
ACTA saw their concerns confirmed while proponents were surprised in view of such behavior 
regarding a legal agreement that had been negotiated in the presence of some of these politicians over 
the preceding years. It hardened resolve on both sides, further polarizing the debate. (Amann, 2012)
In the years before the February 2012 protests, ACTA was mostly debated among experts within the EU 
institutions. Chief among them the EC, who negotiated it on behalf of the EU and the mandate given by 
Member States, and the EP, whose members were initially only aware that ACTA was being negotiated 
yet were not involved in this process. (Ayoob, 2010) (Weatherall, 2011) The EC obviously supported 
the agreement in principle and worked to improve it from their perspective. Most of the Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) on the other hand were not automatically opposed to ACTA itself but 
first of all wished to be better informed. Procedural in nature, these concerns were first expressed when 
MEPs, alarmed by previously leaked drafts of the agreement, passed a resolution on 10 March 2010 
demanding the release of the whole text, to which the Commission obliged on 6 December 2010. 
(European Parliament, 2010) This information confirmed some of the suspicions a few political groups 
concerned with the sensitive nature of net policy, who principally opposed ACTA, have had. (Interview 
(Associated Expert), 2013) However, the final text was rather vague concerning actual sanctions or 
legislative actions. While that would become a major factor in its eventual downfall, in this 
environment, it meant that opponents found it difficult to find compelling factual evidence that the 
agreement would have a drastic enough impact to warrant its rejection. Most heavily disputed 
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suggestions, such as the so-called three-strikes-rule1, had been removed from the final text during 
negotiations. (Meyer, 2012) So, the argument of the opposition shifted to principle, critiquing for 
example the lack of legal certainty and remedy. At the time, this opposition remained confined both in 
distribution and pretension to the EP. Familiar with the legislative procedure, which would require the 
agreement to be ratified by MEPs, such a self-imposed restriction actually represented the most 
effective utilization of resources. Yet the corresponding information campaign quickly reached its 
limits. In addition to ongoing information work conducted by the EC, eager to address the concerns 
expressed by the resolution, ACTA was simply not a priority or even relevant issue for the majority of 
MEPs. (Interview (MEP), 2013)
ACTA proponents, most prominently the EC, on the other hand profited from a favorable 
predisposition among the target audience (i.e. the MEPs) regarding their proposal. The importance of 
copyrights and their enforcement in facilitating and protecting creativity, intellectual innovations and 
design, all identified as cornerstones of EU economy, was well accepted among experts. They were 
also familiar with the usual procedure according to which negotiations take place, thus few took 
offence at the initial secrecy involved once the Commission had published the complete text. The main 
point of content then was the rather small chapter on the internet. Net policy had yet to attain 
mainstream relevance. So even when related concerns were raised they did not seem to interest too 
many MEPs. (Interview (EC Official), 2013)
However, the February 2012 protests against ACTA, first in Poland, then Germany and the rest of
Europe, catapulted ACTA into the spotlight, introducing it to the mainstream. They proved that serious 
concerns regarding the agreement were not limited to a small minority. Even the aforementioned 
resolution in the EP had failed to generate that much public interest in the topic. Now, the evident 
publicity facilitated the quick political prioritization of the issue. (Pignal & Cienski, 2012) The protests 
were certainly the major turning point, introducing and reinforcing a split in the ACTA debate between 
the political experts who had been involved in its negotiation and were going to vote on its ratification 
and the mainstream public who perceived their concerns to be neglected. The increased publicity 
ensured that politicians and other actors scrambled to capitalize on this development. (Bernau, 2012) It 
also brought about a change in argumentation on both sides who found their starting positions reversed. 
Now, the prevailing mood supported the opponents while it regarded the supports of the agreement 
                                                
1 Authorizing Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to disconnect individual internet access on grounds of copyright violations 
after serving two warnings. (Prantl, 2012(a))
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more skeptical, forcing them to adapt a corresponding defense. 
The way in which ACTA entered the public awareness, put proponents at a disadvantage from the start. 
Opponents of the agreement on the other hand found themselves unable to steer the discussion as they 
might have hoped. Not only because the protests and public attention came as a surprise to both sides, 
but mainly due to the rather restricted scope of protesters which limited the appropriation of their 
popularity for other purposes. For the most part, public demands did not extend beyond stopping this 
particular proposal, a side-effect of the protest movements' diverse composition which complicated 
other matters too. On the one hand, it allowed the unification of a wide variety of protesters who had 
different motivations for joining in. On the other hand, while the common goal of defeating ACTA held 
them together, the protesters splintered into their respective subgroups on most other issues. There was
for example no common vision of a viable alternative to be suggested in place of ACTA. Not only did 
this limitation reduce the relevance of this discourse for future discussions but it also diminished the 
chance for an objective debate. (Knop, 2012(a)) (Prantl, 2012(a))
Opponents quickly zeroed in on the perceived consequences of the agreement regarding censorship and 
surveillance. They aimed to support this reasoning with factual evidence, such as passages from the 
agreement and derived the intentions of the negotiators from their conduct (e.g. the secret negotiations 
and the disapproval of public scrutiny). (Silva, 2010) That these passages were based on outdated drafts 
and had long since been removed from the text as it stood in February 2012 was conveniently omitted. 
Vocal ACTA opponents therefore mostly built their arguments to capitalize on the skeptical prevailing 
mood of the mainstream public, at the cost of their viability in expert discussions. (Kreye, 2012(c)) 
(Doctorow, 2012)
Proponents on the other hand did their best to discredit these accusations while emphasizing the 
diminished legal consequence of the text in conjunction with its necessity for the protection of the 
European economy. Finding it difficult to sufficiently explain this inherent contradiction, their position 
was even more disadvantaged in the public discourse. So, proponents downplayed the relevance of 
ACTA for the internet while emphasizing the principal propriety of copyrights and their protection. The 
agreement was thus established as a necessary and long overdue legal update to the application of this 
principle. Accusations against it were addressed by pointing out their factual inaccuracies to quickly 
dismiss them from the discussion. This approach was arguably more aimed at convincing political 
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decision-makers rather than the general public. For that purpose it combined explicit legal analysis of 
the agreement itself, to show that none of the frightening scenarios presented by the opposition were 
actually written down, and a debate on principles, which stressed the importance of copyrights and 
their enforcement for the contemporary European value system. (Arthur, 2013(d))
While the combination of ACTA with the principle of copyrights was accepted by opponents as 
intended, the subsequent public reaction thereto was not. Instead of restricting the opposition, due to 
the generally accepted necessity of copyrights, it fueled their argument further as the legitimacy of 
current models of copyrights was questioned by the public. (von Gehlen, 2012(c))
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2 METHODOLOGY
This Master thesis will utilize a poststructuralist discourse analysis to reveal current trends in political 
decision-making processes at both the national and the EU level which highlight the importance of 
discursive traditions and their effect on societal democratic self-understanding. After introducing some 
general techniques which can be employed to preemptively strengthen any specific argument under 
discussion, the ACTA case study will be utilized to showcase their application. (Foucault, 1982) A 
detailed examination of this agreement, which was rejected by the European Parliament (EP) on 4 July
2012, will be especially interesting for the following reasons:
(1) ACTA is, as far as the legal process is concerned, a ‘concluded case’. This will facilitate 
analysis and evaluation of its development, the different steps it traversed and its inherent 
complexities regarding the reciprocity of public and expert discourse. 
(2) ACTA received a fair share of media attention and remains significant as a landmark debate to 
this day. Essential in initiating an apparently long overdue and ongoing debate on principles 
regarding copyright, the potential impact of its eventual interpretation will be significant not 
only for related debates in the future but also for the evaluation of the political structures within 
which it occurred.
(3) The apparently sudden manifestation of a successful heterogeneous ACTA opposition
combining digital and physical activism implies an atypical change of how different types of 
discourses interact and inform each other. Understanding this reversal of established processes 
will be helpful to adjust discursive practice regarding the inclusion of new venues for debate.
As a first step, the public discourses in two major Member States, namely Germany and the United 
Kingdom (UK), will be analyzed in turn. Based on an inclusive sample over one year, namely from 
October 2011 until October 2012 of online articles of two widely circulated newspapers in each 
country, they will uncover national characteristics of the respective discursive practice. The tabloid 
press has been excluded from these samples because they tend to propagate preconceived perceptions 
of public opinion instead of reporting it. Focusing on online articles offers a precise possibility to 
retrace the specific development of a debate as they are published more frequently and thus capture the 
prevailing sentiment more accurately than printed versions and can be commented on directly by 
internet users. Citations of the German newspapers have been paraphrased as best as possible to 
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establish a comparable basis. (Wodak & Meyer, 2009)
The research also included 15 interviews with Brussels based experts, composed of MEPs, EC officials
and associated experts, who were involved in the ACTA debate at the EU level. It was not possible to 
assemble a representative sample across all political parties or actors involved. Nonetheless, the present 
interviews are believed to constitute a sufficient cross-section of both ACTA proponents and opponents 
from different EU institutions to justify their inclusion in this thesis. To support the analysis, questions 
were designed to investigate the perception of the debate at the EU-level, potentially revealing aspects 
outside the national discussions and facilitating understanding of EU decision-making processes. The 
interviews were semi-structured and consisted of the same 7 questions (to be found in the annex). 
Depending on the given responses, additional topics were explored. Though all interviews were 
planned for 30 minutes, they lasted on average an hour, some of them even 90 minutes. To ensure 
confidentiality, these interviewees will only be referenced by affiliation to one of the above mentioned 
categories. (Denzin & Yvonna, 2005)
The concluding analysis of these findings will uncover and describe developments of discourse, 
assessing their immediate utility and their potential effect on contemporary political structures. In turn, 
current trends regarding the composition and manipulation of contemporary political discourse in the 
EU will be identified. This will facilitate the recognition of opportunities for more effective 
involvement in the political decision-making process. Subsequent investigations might then derive 
improvements to the current structural framework thereof.
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3 WHAT IS POSTSTRUCTURALISM?
Poststructuralism categorizes writings on the inherent inadequacy of social sciences to fully explain 
human behavior due to their dependence on established structures and the inherent complexity of 
human interaction. It posits that there are no objective truths. That the structures in which societies 
organize themselves do not develop out of necessity but rather that social behavior tends to reproduce 
the underlying power structures expressed therein. (Williams, 2005)
Among the theorists who tend to be classified as poststructuralists, many of whom reject the label, 
Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) approach to understand history and social behavior will form the basis 
of this analysis. He focused on the role that discourse (i.e. written and oral communication) plays in 
informing social awareness and decision making. (Foucault, 1991(b))
Discourse can be won by achieving largely unchallenged interpretative hegemony. That means that a 
specific argumentation is accepted by a sufficient majority of participants as true. These form the basis 
to establish facts (i.e. a certain reading of developments which are not challenged henceforth). Or in 
other words, facts constitute an argumentative fallback position which is not disputed further in the 
context of a debate. Foucault argued that understanding the processes by which facts are established,
enables one to uncover the power relations which they actually express. This in turn facilitates 
recognizing the underlying motivation of argumentative reasoning in discourse so as to better evaluate 
both its obvious and hidden intentions. (Foucault, 1982) (Foucault, 1991(b))
One of the most interesting utilizations of poststructuralist discourse analysis is the assessment of so-
called debates on principle. These are debates which, either due to e.g. the time they occurred, the level 
of participation therein or their perceived societal importance, define a specific subset of societal 
understanding. They possess both an immediate (i.e. the actual topic) and a remote (i.e. its role in 
informing any related debates to be held in the future) impact which remains traceable to them. They 
tend to be recognized only in retrospect when their influence is more readily observable. Thus 
identifying them beforehand remains difficult. Facts established by debates on principle will be more 
crucial due to the range of subsequent discourses that they might inform. (Hall, 2001) (Torfing, 1999)
They could for example benefit the assertion of one standard over another (e.g. essential in the so 
called format-wars between for example Betamax and VHS or BlueRay and HighDefinitionDVD) or 
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cement definitions of social order (e.g. that democracy is believed to be the best political system). The 
effort necessary to relinquish any predispositions to established facts among discourse participants 
alone will ensure that concluded debates on principle are seldom challenged. Given the potential 
impact of facts, influencing their creation can be extremely useful. (van Dijk, 1993) To achieve this, 
three aspects of discourse, which will be analyzed in turn, can be addressed, namely access, conduct 
and content. (van Dijk, 1995) 
Access to discourse here means who is included and in turn excluded in what manner from the debate. 
For the purpose of this analysis, those debates that are exclusive in nature will be called expert 
discourses. These include all discussions whose participants have to qualify in one way or the other
(e.g. by party affiliation, professional occupation, societal status, academic reputation, age, gender, etc.)
to participate. In turn, those debates that are essentially open to anyone wishing to participate will be 
called public discourses. (Bacchi, 2000)
These two types of discourse tend to be arranged in a specific way: Interestingly, the more specialized 
or technical the subject matter at hand, the more likely it is that the general public will accept it to be 
discussed in an expert setting. The expert discourse tends to inform aspects of the public discourse due 
to the perception of their respective capacities. Exclusivity implies that participants are experts and thus 
more suited to discuss a specialized topic. Furthermore, most outsiders will have little knowledge of the 
subject under discussion and accordingly might less be likely to be interested in or not care about 
neither the discussion nor its participants. (Kintsch, 1988)
Public discourse on the other hand tends to be more concerned with larger debates. In this context, such 
a distinction relates to its popularity (i.e. the amount of public interest and subsequent participation in 
it). It is shaped by how important citizens judge a specific discussion to be and how it will affect their 
lives. Since not all participants are sufficiently familiar with the technicalities of the issue, public 
discourses tend to be less specific and more concerned with the principle, leaving the details to 
subsequent expert discourses. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 2005) In essence, public interest determines 
the size of any given discourse. So, the less popular the debate, the easier to enforce exclusivity, the 
more popular the discussion, the more likely it will attract popular discussion. (Christiano, 1993)
The definition of what topics are discussed in which setting are fundamental to the definition and self-
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understanding of our political system. In other words, contemporary political systems are characterized 
by the degree to which they facilitate or restrict the participation of citizens therein. The subtle 
differences in form of government across Europe mostly detail how such participation is achieved (i.e.
directly, through an elected representative, etc.). (Dryzek & Dunleavy, 2009)
Popular attitude to particular issues is constantly influenced by lobby groups. A sometimes negatively 
connoted term, lobbying as such simply describes the active attempt to inform a specified target 
population in a predefined way on a particular subject. A staple feature of contemporary political 
decision-making processes, lobbying is an effective non-parliamentarian technique to influence 
political priorities. Due to the sheer number of societal actors who inform public opinion (i.e. work and 
private environment, media, social environment, politics, etc.) however, it is that much more difficult to 
reliably influence or even predict what topics are discussed in open or closed discourses. (Michalowitz, 
2004)
Conduct here means the way arguments within any given debate are built, disseminated and defended. 
It also relates to the distribution of authority embedded within the procedural structure of the discussion 
(i.e. how the meaning of different arguments varies according to who presents it and how it is 
presented). In other words, two factors constitute the conduct: presentation and agency. (McHoul & 
Rapley, 2001)
The aforementioned acceptance of expert discourses on specialized topics for example stems from the 
contemporary belief in the superiority of discursive rationality. So, arguments should present facts with 
as little discernible subjective bias as possible to imply that the argumentation in itself is objectively 
true. In other words, that it remains plausible regardless of the presenter. Agency relates to the opposite 
aspect, namely how arguments are evaluated because of who presents them (i.e. which participants are 
deemed and accepted as experts by whom and due to what qualifications). (Kintsch, 1988)
Finally, content of discourse means both the actual topic under discussion and how it is placed within 
the context of other debates, ongoing or forthcoming. (Connolly, 1993)
All three of these aspects tend to be informed by established facts, created in preceding debates on 
principle. It depends on the aspect however how palpable this influence is. 
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Relating the content of a discussion to the debate on principle which preceded it (e.g. how the detailed 
legislation regarding stem cell research has to be shaped once it is decided whether or not to allow it in 
the first place) might be relatively easy. Correctly predicting the access restrictions of a given 
discourse, if any, might be more difficult, mostly because of changing political priorities. (Schiffrin, 
Tannen & Hamilton, 2001)
Critically reflecting on the conduct of discourse, at last, is most difficult since its ideal direction is 
historically so deeply embedded in our contemporary understanding of discursive structures that it is 
seldom, if ever, challenged. Challenging the supremacy of objectivity here would require the 
reexamination of facts, whose establishment one has not consciously experienced yet according to 
which one has been socialized. That no viable alternative is at first even imaginable shows how deep 
the belief in objectivity and facts is embedded in contemporary individual reasoning. (Foucault, 1991)
The main point of poststructuralism here is not to champion one specific fact over another, but to 
stimulate independent reasoning by creating awareness on how facts are established to identify and 
assess their implied motives and resulting biases for oneself. Through discourse analysis, 
Poststructuralism aims to prompt cognitive dissonance so that the decision what to believe in, is an 
informed and conscious effort of the individual rather than an automatic repetition of firmly rooted 
power structures. (Foucault, 1991(b))
There have been numerous accusations during the ACTA debate regarding for example its non-
transparent development. All polemics or overly simplified descriptions aside, the discussion has been 
characterized by a strong emotional commitment of both proponents and opponents. (Bradshaw & 
Palmer, 2012) (Müller, 2012) This intensification in addition to the increased public interest augmented 
the discourse with consequence beyond the topic at hand. A relevant analysis of this potential impact, in 
addition to the actual one, would have to transcend the structures within which the debate occurred and 
integrate the development thereof. Poststructuralism is believed to be best suited to take the reciprocal 
relationship between this specific discourse and its overall environment into account, thereby 
facilitating a reasonable assessment of the ACTA debate and its lasting effects. (Ashenden, 2005)
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4 THE EVOLUTION OF DISCOURSE
In contemporary understanding, democratic behavior is categorized by discourse. Its structure is so 
deeply embedded that political alternatives are hardly perceivable, idealizing discursive democracy at 
the expensive of all other forms of government. (Gauthier, 1993) While the inherent advantages of such 
political systems are not disputed, settling into any status quo entails a tendency to resist subsequent 
change, forgetting the ever-changing nature of society. Following Foucault’s analysis of sociological 
development, discursive practice is continuously evolving. Omitting such a perspective due to the 
acceptance of the predominant narrative not only impedes societal progress. It also bereaves individuals 
of the clues an understanding of historical advancement could provide, based on which, subtle changes 
to current practices might be recognized. (Foucault, 1982)
The ACTA debate showed how quickly, seemingly accepted conventions could be challenged when the 
associated discourse is neglected. Revealing the public attitude towards copyright enforcement in the 
internet, this discourse emphasized that apparently secure social understandings of pre-established 
systems might easily be disrupted. (Hardin, 1993) On the other hand, the approach regarding the 
associated debate on the principle of copyrights also showed that such upheavals can be very limited. 
Regardless of individual attitude towards ACTA, the surrounding debate exemplified that discursive 
practice not only affected the negotiation of social concerns (i.e. the legitimacy of public protests to 
raise awareness of popular concerns) but simultaneously limited the degree to which current social 
order might develop (i.e. through the implied acceptance of established procedural structures and 
ultimate parliamentarian supremacy over all other political and non-parliamentarian expressions). 
(Foucault, 1982) How this specific case will eventually be classified remains to be seen yet a rough 
understanding of the structural development up until this point is believed to be vital in this regard.
Historically, discourse tended to be decided by force not by argumentative superiority. Enforcing one's 
position despite resistance helped to determine and cement the then current social order, especially in 
the pre-democratic era. The existing power structures were thus inherently flawed in that their validity 
had to be constantly displayed, lest citizens would forget them. Not only was this a very strenuous
system but it implied that alternatives were possible. In other words, why would a supposedly ‘natural’
or ‘god-given’ social order have to be artificially pronounced by the privileged top? (Foucault, 1979)
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Democratic systems in turn determined social course of action through consensual discourse, 
promoting the role of rational argumentation therein. While challenging non-consensual decision-
making processes, this development did not denote the abolition of power structures, it merely 
disguised them. Embedded in discursive practice, they facilitated the specialization and accompanying 
separation between public and expert discourse. The organizational and structural changes required for 
realizing an inclusive approach to policy-making, proved more effective in securing the status quo than 
earlier attempts. Theoretically enabling individuals to participate in discourse automatically increased 
the legitimacy of its result whether or not this offer was actually seized. Idealization of rationality and 
the multitude of available topics under discussion ensured that a certain amount of effort remained 
required to be taken serious in a debate, which in turn also raised the entry barrier for non-professional 
debaters. Emphasis on individual responsibility on the other hand implied that decisions which were 
not actively argued against were consented to. (Peters, 1996)
This should not be misinterpreted as a dismissive reckoning with democratic theory. It just goes to 
show how essential discursive behavior is to our understanding and legitimization of political systems. 
An interesting paradox in this regard is the evaluation of participation. While individual influence 
during a debate grows the fewer people are engaged in it, the lasting impact of the subsequent result is 
diminished to the same extent. The maximization of the two has thus been central to the development 
of discursive behavior over time, especially in expert discourses. (Connolly, 1993)
Democratic decision-making processes are theoretically designed to determine the optimal solution 
through popularity, discouraging obvious bribery through secret ballots and transparent negotiations. 
Exposing the available options to as much scrutiny as possible beforehand is believed to ensure that the 
option eventually commanding the most support will be the most rational. (Dryzek & Dunleavy, 2009) 
During that period, all positions usually aim to influence the debate to their advantage, an essential part 
of discursive reasoning and expected by both participants and observers. So, winning a discourse 
through manipulation is inherently neutral, neither good nor bad. The moral evaluation of the used 
techniques tends to be a retroactive process and largely depends on the actual outcome of the debate. 
Nevertheless, they mostly fall into two categories: conscious and subconscious manipulation. They 
apply to each of the three aspects of discourse outlined earlier, yet in different ways. (Michalowitz, 
2004) (Connolly, 1993)  
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Conscious here means every action whose underlying motivation is readily apprehended by an 
observer. Examples for each of the three aspects include:
1. Access: announcing prohibiting entry criteria (e.g. election thresholds)
2. Conduct: dismissing opposing arguments on unrelated grounds (e.g. gender
discrimination)
3. Content: making an argument which addresses only uncontroversial parts of an issue (e.g.
omitting data protection concerns when proposing information sharing for law
enforcement purposes) (Potter, 1996)
Subconscious here means every action whose underlying motivation is intended to be difficult, if at all, 
perceivable by an observer. Examples include:
1. Access: previously presenting the debate in a way which discourages participation 
(e.g. promoting the technical complexity of an issue)
2. Conduct: dismissing opposing arguments on technical grounds (e.g. insisting on the 
observation of procedural deadlines)
3. Content: emphasizing the applicability of preexisting facts to prevent closer examination
of a related point in one's own argumentation. (e.g. establishing a proposal to
monitor financial transactions as the principal extension of the State's interest to
identify tax evasion) (Potter, 1996)
Not surprisingly, contemporary democratic discourse sees fewer instances of conscious manipulation 
due to the number of competing positions. Their mutual monitoring ensures that too blunt manipulation 
attempts are quickly exposed. That usually restrains even those debaters who might be powerful 
enough to impose their preferences against the will of others from doing so. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 
2005) (Christiano, 1993)
Subconscious manipulation on the other hand, is believed to be more common. They tend to be 
effective whether they actually succeed or not as potential opponents would be required to divert effort 
from their actual argumentation to detect and subsequently expose them. (Michalowitz, 2004)
An interesting hybrid is the so called thought-terminating cliché. This type of argument is designed to 
introduce argumentative fallback positions or facts which are not discussed further. They reduce the 
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complexity of previously established facts, which might be unrelated or irrelevant to the current issue. 
The result is intended to appeal to debaters, equating simplicity with logic, to completely shut down 
critique. Needless to say, they are most effective when remaining unchallenged. Whether they are 
categorized as subconscious or conscious manipulation depends on the extent to which they are 
accepted as objective fact or identified as thought-terminating cliché respectively. (Lifton, 1989) While 
this evaluation might vary individually, it conveys that facts themselves constitute the epitome of 
subconscious manipulation. After all, they are defined by the extent to which they are challenged: 
seldom, if at all. (Foucault, 1991(b))
The current and long-standing anti-terrorism debate provides some good examples of utilizing thought-
terminating clichés in discourse: 
In the wake of the large-scale terrorist attacks in New York, United States of America (USA) on 11 
September 2001, in Madrid, Spain 11 March 2004 and in London, UK 7 July 2005, European 
legislation has dramatically increased the authority of law-enforcement agencies to combat terrorism at 
the expense of individual freedoms and rights. (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003) In most of the associated 
discussions, proponents often pointed out that this was necessary to apprehend terrorists. (Chailand & 
Blin, 2007) Arguing this way created a moral barrier to critique these restrictions as it suggested that 
only terrorists had to worry about them, thus implying that only terrorists would oppose them. (Zedner, 
2005)
Another example would be the debate on the introduction of so-called body-scanners at airports. Their 
technical specifications and inner workings were excluded from discussion lest they offer clues as to 
how to overcome them. While on the surface a somewhat reasonable point, it also prevented scientific 
evaluation of these machines' potentially adverse health effects by independent experts. It thus bereft 
body-scanner opponents of an argument in the debate. (Mitchener-Nissena, Bowers & Chetty, 2012)
The occurrence of each category of manipulation varies depending on the respective aspect of 
discourse. Arguments regarding access tend to be influenced by a mix of conscious and subconscious 
manipulation, depending on the extent to which the authority of the proposed group of participants is 
accepted by the public. The theoretical division of powers for example is clearly specified and accepted 
in contemporary democracies, thus the legislative authority of a Parliament and the exclusivity of its 
membership is seldom challenged. Yet who from outside this political structure (e.g. lobbyists, NGOs, 
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civil society, etc.) may consult or contact them in what way, varies depending on the topic. (van Dijk, 
1995)
Arguments regarding conduct tend to be influenced mostly by subconscious manipulation so as to deny 
an opponent benefits while retaining them for oneself. Approaching this openly, would by contrast 
create an equal basis for all participants. The aforementioned thought-terminating clichés would be an 
example. These justify the exclusion of one or more specific points from the current debate in a way 
which impedes counter-arguments by closely connecting the issue at hand with a suitable pre-
established fact. Opponents then either have to accept the exclusion of some points, which might have 
been used to improve their argument, or they have to challenge an accepted fact, potentially damaging 
their own credibility. Regardless of the actual choice, they would be diverting effort from building an 
argument for the issue at hand. (Michalowitz, 2004)
Lastly, arguments regarding content tend to be influenced mostly by conscious manipulation. 
Subconscious efforts are simply not as effective here since all arguments are expected to have self-
promoting intentions. (Kintsch, 1988)   
In addition, assuming the goal is to win a specific debate, a hierarchy among the three aspects of 
discourse can be discerned:
1. Access: Successful manipulation thereof would enable one to preselect the opposition. 
2. Conduct: Influence here would enable the prior regulation of what kinds of arguments will 
be used, facilitating for example the introduction or exposition of thought-
terminating clichés. 
3. Content: Exerting authority in this aspect would enable the specialized adaptation of one’s 
own argumentative position, to take advantage of potential weak points of the 
opposition. Still, the effectiveness of an argument here depends to a great extent
on the preliminary work regarding the other two aspects. (Michalowitz, 2004)
To conclude, defining the political system we live in and the processes through which it can be 
modified shows how central discourse remains to our democratic self-perception and behavior. 
Pointing out how the interpretation thereof can be manipulated showcases the need for ongoing 
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individual critical reflection, strenuous though it might be. While such cognitive dissonance will not be 
able to identify a mystical absolute truth, it might facilitate the recognition of the motives underlying 
the arguments we encounter. Consciously evaluating them might enable one to expose the power 
structures which continue to be embedded through discourse, ensuring that their acceptance or refusal 
is a conscious act rather than an unconscious reproduction. (Williams, 2005)
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5 THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE
The February 2012 protests introduced the ACTA case to the mainstream. While the agreement had 
been rudimentary covered by the press before, it remained a niche topic until then. (Menn, 2010) The 
huge turnout at the initial demonstrations in Poland and subsequent events in other Member States 
demonstrated that ACTA was relevant to the public yet this varied among states. Extended coverage by 
the newly intrigued mainstream media exposed the surrounding debate even more and in turn 
facilitated more public attention. (Hauck & Kuhn, 2012)
Public discourse on a given topic can be influenced to a large extent through the way it is covered by 
the mainstream media due to the impact of reporting on public opinion making. This was also 
showcased in the ACTA case where the initial presentation of the agreement favored only one specific 
line of argumentation which continued to inform the remainder of the public discourse. (Meyer, 2012)
An analysis of the two most widely circulated daily national newspapers for the UK (i.e. the Guardian 
and the Financial Times (FT)) and Germany (i.e. the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)) will be utilized to retrace this predisposition and its impact. In the following 
the coverage of ACTA by these four newspapers will thus be compared to reveal national 
characteristics. 
5.1 German Public Discourse
The following chapter will present the public discourse on ACTA in Germany from October 2011 until 
October 2012 to showcase its effect. FAZ and SZ articles have been analyzed jointly due to space 
restrictions. It sampled 17 articles regarding ACTA from the FAZ and 22 from the SZ, published on 
their respective web pages between October 2011 and October 2012, starting their coverage on 6 
February 2012. 
Together they presented multiple aspects of the debate but commonly focused on the public protests 
against ACTA, which had either already happened in Poland the weeks before or were planned for the 
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following Saturday, as a continuation of the then recent SOPA/PIPA controversy in the USA2. (Kurz, 
2012) Copyright was quickly identified to be the underlying issue of this debate. A specific validation 
of the contemporary German system not only accounted for technical developments but also pointed to 
the changes in societal norms and values associated with radical reforms. ACTA opponents were at the 
center of attention, detailing their concerns, both expert and layman, regarding the agreement.
Considering the limited response given by ACTA proponents and the German government, it was 
hardly surprising that the demonstrations continued. (von Gehlen, 2012(b))
Overall, central to these initial and almost all following portrayals were four main topics, which will be 
presented in turn. They addressed the context, the conduct and the participants of the debate. 
5.1.1 Political developments
This placed the German developments within the wider European context by addressing the 
developments in other EU member states such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Latvia, where 
considerable protests had also prompted the delay of the national ratification. (Bernau, 2012) The first 
divisions among party lines were also reported, with the Pirate party, the Greens and the Left against 
ACTA and Conservatives, industry groups and the EC for it. When the German Office of Foreign 
Affairs announced that it would postpone the signature of the agreement “… until all outstanding 
concerns have been addressed …” (Bernau, 2012) on February 10th 2012, ACTA was declared dead, as 
the German government was perceived as having handed the case off and awaiting a cue on what to do 
next from Brussels despite their earlier declaration to support ACTA. (Amann & Ankenbrand, 2012)
(Freisfeld, Jahn & Stabenow, 2012)
While other relevant developments were reported on, such as the referral of the agreement to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the EC to assess its conformity to the EU acquis, this stance 
persisted. In the absence of game-changing developments which could revive ACTA until the July vote 
in the EP, the focus mostly remained on the underlying issue of copyrights, implicitly reinforcing their
                                                
2 The Stop Online Piracy ACT (SOPA) and the PROTECT Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) were legislative proposals 
aiming to facilitate the enforcement of copyright in the internet by restricting access to or shutting down websites which 
host or facilitate the trading of pirated content. On January 18th 2012 the websites of Wikipedia, Google and others either 
remained blacked out or displayed a banner, to inform visitors of the SOPA/PIPA plans. This publicity stunt proved 
extremely effective in creating mainstream awareness thereof and the subsequent public outrage resulted in the shelving of 
SOPA & PIPA shortly after. (Pepitone, 2012) (Magid, 2012) (Kurz, 2012)
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earlier statements regarding ACTA’s prospects. (von Gehlen, 2012(a))
A notable exception here was the early recognition of missing points of contact between politicians and 
the protesters, especially the internet community. Although “… nobody knows yet how a dialogue 
between the two worlds might be achieved …” (Höll, 2012(a)), politicians were starting to address this 
problem, a process which continued with limited success. (Höll, 2012(a))
5.1.2 ACTA positions
The two sides of the ACTA debate were introduced as follows: 
On the one side were opponents, who were concerned that the envisioned extension of law enforcement 
authority in ACTA would serve as a pretext to enhance internet surveillance and censorship on behalf 
of the copyright industry. They critiqued the negotiation of the agreement on procedural grounds. Their 
argument, presented through demonstrations and public debates, was targeted at a mainstream audience 
to generate popular support, implicitly lobbying MEPs and other publicly elected officials to vote 
against ACTA. (Küchemann, 2012(b))
On the other side were proponents, who argued that, given the principal importance of copyright 
inherent to contemporary European value systems, an application thereof to the internet remained
absolutely necessary. They also emphasized, as expressed by the German government, that “… many of 
the accusations raised in the internet are not correct …” (Roßmann & Höll, 2012). They targeted the 
mainstream public mostly to discourage popular support for ACTA opponents, while their main focus 
remained on convincing the relevant political decision-makers to support the agreement. (Roßmann & 
Höll, 2012)
Though the two groups were never precisely categorized, opponents for example included members of 
the internet community, protesters, legal and academic experts on copyrights and finally, politicians 
from a growing number of major political parties. They could further be divided into critics of the 
agreement itself and of the contemporary copyright system overall. (Höll, 2012(a)) The former usually 
included the popular protesters (i.e. the people in the streets and the internet community) and the latter 
tended to be experts (i.e. academic and legal specialists and party representatives). (Küchemann, 
2012(a)) While most protesters seemed content to defeat ACTA in itself, experts merely saw it as a 
necessary step before negotiating the adaptation of the overall copyright system. Interestingly, the 
THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE
20
majority of ACTA opponents did not doubt the institution of copyrights as such, apart from a few 
protesters, who were presented as radical. (Gehlen, 2012(b)) (Prantl, 2012(b)) Critique of the 
agreement focused on the conduct of the negotiations (i.e. the alleged secrecy) which in turn warranted
the concerns regarding the content of the agreement (i.e. the potentially oppressive legal initiatives 
taken because of ACTA). The expert argument on the other hand judged the agreement as too wide and 
unspecific. While also doubting the effectiveness of the proposed measures, the main argument was 
that the text did not provide legal certainty or remedy. (Off, 2012) (Kreye, 2012(a))
Proponents on the other hand initially included the EC, industry representatives and a declining number 
of politicians. Amongst them, the argument was split as well. 
One group, the EC and, at first, some of the politicians, mostly focused on promoting the agreement 
itself by addressing the concerns regarding its conduct and content. They cited that for example the 
widespread allegations of secrecy were unfounded since the relevant documents had been already 
published in December 2010. Furthermore, secret negotiations were quite common in trade talks to 
allow participants room to maneuver. (Kuhn, 2012(a)) They also stressed that ACTA remained fully 
compliant to the EU aquis and did neither include any legal requirements to create any of the repressive 
instruments imagined nor required any modification of existing German law. (Carstens, 2012)
The other group (i.e. lobbyists, politicians and a few copyright holders) focused more on promoting the 
principle of copyrights per se. While they principally supported ACTA as an essential tool in 
safeguarding copyrights in Europe and beyond, they did not necessarily argue in favor of this specific 
agreement due to the public animosity associated with that stance. (Bender, 2012(a)) Eventually, most 
of the proponents, except the EC, shifted their argument to this position, implicitly accepting the defeat 
of ACTA long before its rejection by the EP. 
So, the argument against ACTA ultimately dominated the public discourse due to the continuing 
exploitation of the existing skeptical prevailing mood towards the agreement and the aforementioned 
difference in discursive focus of the two sides. (Kuhn, 2012(b))
The protests which introduced ACTA to the mainstream had already voiced many of the concerns 
which persisted throughout the discussion. (Amann & Ankenbrand, 2012) The ineffectual explanations, 
with which ACTA proponents addressed these concerns, stressing the conceptual importance of the 
agreement so as to convince MEPs of its necessity, actually impaired their defense. Not only because 
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ignoring accusations could have been perceived as implicitly acknowledging them. Rather due to the 
fact that it was readily interpreted as openly neglecting popular concerns, an impression fostered by the 
protest movement from the beginning. Reported publicity blunders by ACTA proponents further 
reinforced such beliefs. Chief among them was Commissioner de Gucht's advice to MEPs “… not to let 
themselves be too impressed by the protests in some Member States …” (Knop, 2012(a)), implying 
they were mainly based on misunderstanding or willfully misinterpreting the facts. Publicly expressing 
such a patronizing stance towards popular concerns would have certainly damaged any argumentative 
position. It certainly invoked public resentment, thereby also complicating the subsequent introduction 
of potential sympathizers to the debate. (Knop, 2012(a))
Overall, the movement vocally supporting ACTA seemed to shrink while the opposition grew. 
5.1.2.1 The Internet Community
A group newly introduced to the mainstream by this debate was the so-called internet community. The 
initial protests and internet information campaigns and stunts were attributed to this major though 
elusive player. Described as a predominantly younger generation of internet users, which according to 
the not very differentiated presentation includes online activists, hackers, bloggers, etc., the internet 
community was presented as the main challenger of traditional copyrights in the digital environment. 
(Peters, 2012) Not necessarily because they favored illegal downloads, but because they were against 
any accompanying increase in surveillance. Their rallying point in general was not any specific 
political proposal but net neutrality, which they saw threatened by ACTA. (Amann & Ankenbrand, 
2012) They were presented as a defender of the status quo, thus implicitly favored. (Hofmann, 2012) 
That this special status was independent of their actual proportion to the mainstream population and 
thereby their representative legitimacy, was not reflected upon. (von Gehlen, 2012(b)) Other grounds 
for critique of the internet community were explored in separate discussions (e.g. the phenomenon of 
so called shitstorms, outlined below). Aspects such as the hacker attacks on government websites in 
Poland and other countries were reported but hardly critiqued or attributed to the internet community. 
(Küchemann, 2012(b))
The arguments of ACTA supporters were by contrast more thoroughly questioned, possibly reflecting 
the disproportionate amount of opponents in the discussion. Furthermore, proponents tended to argue 
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principally (i.e. on the need for copyright itself regardless of what happened to this specific agreement) 
rather than factually (i.e. on ACTA itself). The voices of legal and academic experts were intermixed 
regardless, arguably lending credibility to both positions. The overall presentation of ACTA, either 
portrayed negatively or as hardly relevant for the wider copyright discourse, further facilitated the early 
condemnation of the agreement. (Hauck, 2012)
5.1.2.2 Shitstorm
The shitstorm, a certain form of the digital noise the internet community had raised, was critiqued in 
some detail. It warrants individual analysis as it reflected on the conduct of the public debate overall. It 
was defined as neither balanced nor legitimate banter, arguing that such digital gossip should not be the 
basis for political decision making. The outrage displayed so impressively by parts of internet users 
against any defenders of ACTA (i.e. individual copyright holders, lobby groups, etc.) through emails, 
hacker attacks, angry blog entries, etc. were for the most part little more than insulting rants. Lacking 
any constructive aspect, they represented the antithesis to democratic opinion making through 
discourse. Policy makers acting on such campaigns instead of proper debate outside the internet would 
therefore be less democratic since the opinions voiced online were and remain easily inflated and might 
not constitute an accurate representation of society. (Bender, 2012(a)) (Amann, 2012)
5.1.3 Debate on Principle 
Ignoring physical goods from the start, the change in consumer behavior brought about by the internet 
remained central to the discussion. It was argued that not the volume of consumption had changed, as
the content industry continued to complain in light of falling revenues, but the venue thereof. 
(Grossmann & Kirsch, 2012) (Moorstedt, 2012)
As the existing structures to protect and enforce copyright could not be as simply digitalized as 
consumer behavior, their supplementary adaption was identified as the core issue of the debate. 
Especially the distribution model was seen as crucial there because it encapsulated the problem to 
guarantee the dissemination of copyrighted content that is fair both to consumers and to copyright 
holders. The approach as represented in ACTA (i.e. its alleged surveillance and censoring capacities)
was not appreciated but rather fueled corresponding concerns of protesters that the enforcement of 
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copyrights would take priority over net neutrality. Without a corresponding response by the industry, 
the criticism continued, questioning amongst others their efficiency, their utility for the majority of 
copyright holders even if working as intended and their causal effect on economic growth. Sensing the 
potential challenge to existing non-digital copyrights, most of ACTA proponents centered on the less 
challenging aspects of the agreement (i.e. physical product piracy) arguably hoping to link the principle 
of copyrights to the ratification of the agreement when minimizing the relevance of its internet chapter
to increase its chances for ratification. (Grossmann & Kirsch, 2012) (Kurz, 2012)
Representatives from all major German parties at the time and a few other experts introduced the 
variety of conceivable options on how to address this issue of copyrights. Presenting an arguably 
balanced overview of available suggestions to the public, none of them was actually championed. Still, 
it was stressed that, before any viable policies could be developed, this problem would need to be 
solved. Such a process would not only be shaped by usual political decision-making processes but 
would also cement the associated social norms. (von Gehlen, 2012(b)) (von Gehlen, 2012(d))
5.1.4 German Public Discourse Conclusions
Brought to the attention of the mainstream public through the mass protests in February 2012, the 
presentation of the ACTA debate retained a slight bias towards the opposition throughout. Partly 
because of argumentative and PR mistakes by proponents but mostly because the two sides addressed 
the public discourse differently. (Müller, 2012)
Considering the structural constraints of EU decision-making processes, focusing on the expert 
discourse seemed to be the most effective way to ensure ACTA's ratification. Yet actively conveying 
the implied negligence of the public discourse had to quickly offset any associated principal advantage. 
The ECs' position as among the prime advocates of ACTA thus quickly dissolved into being one of the 
few, if not the sole vocal supporter of the agreement. This homogeneity made it difficult for other 
supporters to join the argument lest they would be publicly evaluated not by their own argumentation 
but by the previous actions of the EC. (Kreye, 2012(b))
The opposition on the other hand remained a heterogeneous group without common leadership. Even 
its constituting subgroups lacked prominent key figures with which to identify. This provided only 
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limited connections among the opposition itself, which explains why subgroups tended to be more self-
centered. (Hofmann, 2012) That this group did not eventually implode depended solely on its limited 
scope. As each subgroup shared the most common goal (i.e. defeating ACTA) but was uninterested to 
negotiate a common position on anything else, each was free to plan and execute their subsequent 
course of action as they saw fit. Those that were not interested in anything beyond defeating ACTA 
would not worry further. Those that saw ACTA as one of many doubtful legislative proposals were 
confident that they would be able to defeat any similar initiatives in the future. (Paukner, 2012) Those 
that wanted to establish a viable alternative in its place were focused on transferring the momentary 
popularity into continuing political influence. The resulting difficulty to establish a certainty regarding 
the demands of the opposition as a whole, inherently limited the impact their discursive position would 
be able to have due to the structural constraints within which it operated. While achieving their 
immediate goal did not require a homogenous opposition, the discursive bargaining to subsequently 
establish an own alternative to the agreement was seriously impeded by a lack thereof. (von Gehlen, 
2012(c)) (Heidtmann, 2012)
5.2 British Public Discourse
The following chapter will present the public discourse on ACTA in the UK from October 2011 until 
October 2012 to showcase its effect. The articles from the sampled newspapers have been analyzed 
jointly due to space restrictions. It sampled 12 articles regarding ACTA from the Guardian and 7 from 
the FT, published on their respective web pages between October 2011 and October 2012. 
Overall, the ACTA debate had received comparatively little coverage in the British mainstream press. 
Initially, the agreement was placed in the context of the then recently shelved Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA) and PROTECT Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) in the USA. (Arthur, 2012(a))
The presentation of ACTA centered at first on the renewed protests and associated developments in 
Poland, after the EU and 22 other Member States, including Poland and the UK, had signed the 
agreement on January 26th 2012. While acknowledging that the proposal had “... been significantly 
changed from earlier versions ...” (Arthur, 2012(a)) the assertion that it shared “...some similarities with 
the hotly debated Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in the US ...” (Arthur, 2012(a)) implied a skeptical 
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stance towards it. The initial protests in Poland, both the hacking attacks and the physical 
manifestations continued to be featured throughout the debate. Given the lack of similar actions in the 
UK until the European wide February 11th protests, it seemed not surprising that the Polish responses 
were identified as the starting point. (Bradshaw & Palmer, 2012)
Being introduced as “... the latest in a string of measures planned to combat online piracy to falter in 
the face of coordinated protests ...” (Pignal & Cienski, 2012) ACTA was on the defensive from the 
outset. The internet chapter was quickly identified as the main source of public discontent, despite 
contrary assurances of the EC. Heightened sensitivity regarding net policy issues at the time and the 
evident success of combining hacking attacks and demonstrations to draw attention to these issues, as 
shown especially in Poland, foreshadowed the approach to ACTA. A continuing association with SOPA 
and PIPA, including individual perspectives from then prominent opponents like Kader Arif3, further 
facilitated a skeptical prevailing mood. (Arthur, 2012(b)) Although the EU secured the removal of 
some troubling provisions, like the three-strikes-rule, ACTA was still seen as “... troubling on several 
counts.” (Meyer, 2012) Most prominent among those were its loose definitions, lacking legal certainty, 
and the fact that it had already been finalized. This left no option but to actively lobby national and 
European parliamentarians to reject it. Furthermore, rights holders were believed to be at the core of 
this and similar agreements as they saw their established business models threatened by the internet.
(Meyer, 2012)
Among the first active British involvement with ACTA was the participation in the coordinated 
European wide protests on 11 February 2012. The support of the British Pirate party for this action day 
also seemed to constitute the first time that a national political party had commented, at least in a minor 
way, on the developments. Given their relative political insignificance in the UK this might have been 
motivated by a desire to raise awareness. (Plunkett, 2012)
British public participation at the European action day itself appeared to be of little importance. The 
focus remained on presumably larger protests in other Member States such as Germany, Poland and 
Bulgaria. Generally, the debate remained more balanced than elsewhere because it actually considered 
ACTA supporters and the way they organized themselves. (Arthur, 2012(c))
                                                
3 A French MEP who resigned his position as EP rapporteur on ACTA to protest against the way it was negotiated and its 
potential impacts. (Arthur, 2012(b))
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Providing them with agency outside the EU institutions in this way furthered the understanding that 
organized support for ACTA was not limited to the EC. Given the limited overall coverage of the issue, 
every reference of proponents stuck out even more. Furthermore, a possible reason for the apparent 
British indifference on the issue might have been the knowledge that “... its copyright and 
counterfeiting laws …” were “… already as strong as any suggested in ACTA.” (Arthur, 2012(c))
The decision to refer ACTA to the ECJ was welcomed as it would possibly provide more clarity on the 
issue of compatibility. Yet doubts persisted as to whether a court ruling would be able to address most 
of the other issues. There were also concerns that public interest would have died down by then, 
enabling ACTA to resurface in a calmer political climate, possibly increasing its chances for 
ratification. (Pignal, 2012) Also, at this point, the perception of EU institutions was split in the sense
that the EP was perceived to advocate citizens’ concerns against the others. (Arthur, 2012(d))
The suggestion by Neelie Kroes, the European Commissioner for Telecoms and Technology, that ACTA 
was unlikely to be ratified, was assumed to foreclose the result of the plenary vote in July. (Arthur, 
2012(e)) In light of this development there were some calls cautioning against an overestimation of 
unconventional lobbying. They pointed out that even the supposedly new forms of public expression 
(i.e. the recently successful combination of coordinated digital and physical demonstrations) were still 
subject to traditional political and legal structures. This position argued that despite the increased role 
of technology, tech-savvy internet users still constituted a minority. Regardless of the growing 
importance of net policy issues, citizen-centered policies would also need to include the majority of 
citizens without deeper technical knowledge of the internet. (Doctorow, 2012)
Briefly showcasing the conduct of the debate between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was 
the argument between for example the Publishers Association (PA), a representation of publishers in 
the UK, and Google or the Open Rights Group (ORG), an advocate for digital rights. The PA claimed 
that campaigning for a completely unregulated internet would facilitate online piracy. They thus 
implicitly equated internet freedom with theft of intellectual property. Strictly denying such a 
connection, Google responded by emphasizing its engagement with rights holders to combat online 
piracy while the ORG argued that instead, regulation of the internet runs the danger of facilitating 
government or corporate censorship. While this point was sadly not explored any further it at least 
started introducing a more differentiated perspective on the actors involved in the overall debate. 
(Bradshaw & Palmer, 2012)
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After the EP's International Trade Committee (INTA), the lead committee on ACTA, rejected the 
agreement, there was little doubt that the ACTA would be defeated in the plenary vote. While that 
expectation was subsequently proven, it was still pointed out that the agreement could possibly be 
revived by the EC in the future, depending on the eventual ECJ ruling. (Arthur, 2012(f)) Nevertheless, 
opponents were quickly expressing their gratitude for this outcome. Proponents on the other hand, 
though bemoaning the rejection, appeared eager to explore alternatives as soon as possible. While the 
ACTA chapter in the global struggle for stricter copyright legislation was perceived to be closed for 
good, the need to address the underlying issue remained unchanged. (Barber, 2012) The content 
industry would be on one side, eager to revert its falling revenues, while technology companies, such as 
Google and Facebook would “... remain wary of evasive online copyright rules, which they fear could 
make them liable for links and content that they cannot easily control …” (Fontanella-Khan, 2012).
That this issue will need to be addressed regardless remained unchallenged as opponents and 
proponents alike confirm the need to protect intellectual property. (Arthur, 2012(g))
Following assessments of the concluded case were surprisingly critical, insisting to objectively evaluate 
the concluded case. For example, these interpretations acknowledged that “... the anti-counterfeiting 
treaty had some good intentions behind it ...” (Arthur, 2012(h)). For the most part, these referred to the 
provisions regarding physical goods. The internet chapter was identified as the crucial issue of the 
agreement. Regardless of their justification, the purposeful selection of different aspects about the 
negotiation process (e.g. the secrecy thereof, the fear that border controls would include inspection of 
private digital media, the vague definitions of the final text, etc.) meant that “... a social crowd formed 
online with one aim, of killing ACTA …” (Arthur, 2012(h)). Connoted an internet tidal wave, this 
behavior ensured that the agreement was unlikely to be ratified casually, as might have been expected 
otherwise. Interestingly, the previously often repeated secrecy of ACTA negotiations was explained as a 
necessary part of political bargaining only from this time on. (Arthur, 2012(h))
Continuing the critique of ACTA protesters, other positions added that the rejection of the agreement, 
and by implication other regulation attempts, would not result in a free internet as might be imagined. 
First, because copyrights as the underlying core issue would still have to be addressed. Second, because 
the implied lax public attitude towards online piracy, was believed to be damaging to society in the 
long run. A reinforcement of contemporary value systems, the argument was simple: if no one would be 
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willing to pay for content, no content would be produced. That modern consumers were not realizing 
the apparently self-destructing behavior of demanding free online content was presented as worrisome. 
The only way to address this growing problem would be governmental intervention, in other words: 
relevant legislation. (Morrison, 2012) Arguably a call to policy makers and consumers alike, it 
reinforced the conviction that the conflict regarding the adaptation of copyrights was far from over. 
5.2.1 British Public Discourse Conclusions
At first glance, the British debate appeared to be much more balanced than other national debates (i.e.
the German one). Constantly considering the non-European origins of the agreement, alluding to its 
development and possible effects in different countries, within and outside the EU placed the national 
discussion in a more global context. (Bradshaw & Palmer, 2012(a)) It also meant that the ACTA 
protests in Poland brought the issue to mainstream attention in the UK. The different sides of the EU 
debate were also more pronounced in that it not only featured the institutional actors but also relevant 
NGOs of proponents and opponents alike. Still, the prevailing mood slightly favored ACTA 
contestants. (Bradshaw & Palmer, 2012(a)) Aspects of the agreement which were concerning continued 
to be highlighted, for example the secrecy of most of its negotiation and the alleged assumption that it 
would just be rubberstamped by the EP. (Arthur, 2012(g)) (Fontanella-Khan, 2012)
On second thoughts, the British debate appeared somewhat indifferent to the developments. The 
sporadic reporting mostly followed the major political developments. Overall, mainstream interest 
seemed rather small, especially when compared to other Member States. Neither the signature of the 
UK government, nor the European Action Day appeared to have evoked exceptional public responses. 
(Arthur, 2012(a)) Another peculiarity of the British discourse were recognizable attempts to nationalize 
the debate. The pronounced reactions in Eastern and Central Europe for example were explained in two 
irritating ways:
1. Historically: A reasonable deduction considering the experiences with secret police and 
Communist state surveillance these countries (i.e. Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, etc.) have had.
2. Opportunistic: because “... downloading films and music is a popular way for many young 
Eastern Europeans to obtain free entertainment …” (Arthur, 2012(c)).
This was the only instance in which the fear of being caught was utilized to explain the motivation of 
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protesters. The motivation for introducing such a thought-terminating cliché, because it suggested that 
ACTA only concerned those engaging in illegal downloading, remained elusive. Even if the argument 
would apply to some proportions of protesters, there was no discernible reason to mention this there. 
(Meyer, 2012) It might be possible that the establishment of such national stereotypes was not intended 
to demean those concerned. Rather, since there was no further follow-up, creating otherness in such a 
way might have been intended to foster the special status of the British within Europe. Then, pointing 
out opportunistic behavior of others might serve to define what the national debate was not supposed to 
be like. (Arthur, 2012(c)) However, amidst significantly lower public participation and the implied 
moral elevation above other, more engaged populations, this would not be exemplary in any case. 
5.3 Overall Public Discourse Conclusions
The national debates succeeded for the most part in conveying the structurally predetermined simplicity 
of the issue. As ACTA had already been finalized, it could only be ratified or rejected as a whole, 
without room for amendments. While factually correct, this urgency showcased the most prominent 
difference in national emphasis. While the German discourse eagerly assessed the debate and how its 
underlying issue could be addressed, the British discourse appeared to be comparatively indifferent to 
the debate. (Müller, 2012) (Arthur, 2012(a))
Common to both public discourses was the utilization of non-national developments, namely the 
SOPA/PIPA protests in the USA and the Polish ACTA protests, to introduce the debate. The attitude 
expressed by the demonstrations predetermined the overall sentiment towards the agreement for the 
remainder of the discussion. Public attention in both countries focused on similar key points 
throughout, mostly following the political developments. These included the European-wide protests 
against ACTA on 11 February 2012 (Bernau, 2012), its referral to the ECJ by the EC on 22 February 
2012 (Pignal, 2012), the suggestion by Neelie Kroes that ACTA might not come into force as it is on 2 
May 2012 (Arthur (e), 2012), the votes on ACTA in the EP subcommittees, especially the lead INTA 
committee on 21 June 2012 (Arthur, 2012(f)) and the final vote in the plenary on 4 July 2012 (Kafsack, 
2012). Since it was quickly concluded that ACTA would be defeated, the public discourse strengthened 
its focus on how to handle copyrights, identified to be at the core of the agreement. 
The justification for dismissing the agreement so early on rested on similar arguments in both Member 
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States. While the worrisome character of some of these is not disputed, the way in which they were 
portrayed is. To explain, the example of secret negotiations was continuously promoted, suggesting a 
hidden agenda. While that served to raise suspicions, it conveniently failed to mention that secret 
negotiations are not an extraordinary but a common feature of political bargaining. Different parties 
might adopt extreme stances while negotiating that they do not want to become public before arriving 
at an agreeable consensus. The problem with presenting usual procedures in this way is that it might 
endanger the credibility of other, more relevant arguments if uncovered. In other words, a viable 
critique of ACTA is believed to have been possible without relying on this technique. Additionally it 
presupposes that those adopting such an argument will either accept it unreflectively or will not care 
about these methods being used. Not a flattering assumption in either case. (Bender, 2012(b))
A similar point is the accusation that the agreement was intended to be ratified in silence, past 
established national and international regulating bodies. First of all, that assumes that EU officials are 
either not aware of the established ratification process or are able to circumvent it, neither of which is 
very likely. Or in other words, even if assuming that all the conspiracy theories regarding the intent of 
ACTA are true, what are the chances that the scheming masterminds behind it would have forgotten 
that to be ratified it would have to be voted on by elected officials? Such masterminds would indeed 
have to be very selective in their thought processes. (Schwartmann, 2012) Additionally, it would 
paradoxically pronounce popular confidence in their elected representatives and deprive them of it at 
the same time. Simple because it implies thatthe same body of MEPs whom the public trusted to defeat 
ACTA, would have simply rubberstamped the agreement without the protests. This would pronounce 
popular confidence in their elected representatives and deprive them of it at the same time. Given that 
the full text was released in 2010 already, such a perception of the abilities of MEPs could not be very 
reassuring for the citizen. (von Gehlen, 2012(c)) Rather than believing this, perhaps the possibility that 
ACTA was not as one-dimensional as had been implied could be entertained. Accordingly, instead of 
presuming malicious intent, it could be assumed that negotiators genuinely believed in the agreement. 
Otherwise they would not have defended it as long and as fiercely as they did, fully aware of the 
reputational damage this would mean. This is not suggesting that their argument should be accepted 
just because they were convinced themselves. But simply dismissing opposing points on irrelevant 
grounds will eventually weaken any position as well as discursive practice overall. This in turn also 
applies to overrating the relevance of one’s own arguments. (Torfing, 1999)
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6 THE EXPERT DISCOURSE
The following chapter is based on 15 face-to-face interviews with Brussels based experts, conducted by 
the author between January and February 2013. Though anonymous, the author wishes to express his 
utmost gratitude to all interviewees for finding the time in their busy schedules to detail the ACTA 
debate from their perspective. Due to the sensitivity of the issue and to maintain the guaranteed 
confidentiality of interviewees, no quotes have been included, transcripts have been omitted and 
references follow their aforementioned categorization (i.e. according to position). 
6.1 Interviews Summary
Most experts expressed the conviction that the February 2012 protests against ACTA came as a surprise 
to these involved in the debate. (Interview (MEP), 2013)
Concerns regarding the agreement had been expressed by the EP already years earlier, for example on 
10 March 2010, when it passed a resolution demanding the publication of the negotiated text. Still, a 
reliable majority among MEPs against ACTA in the scheduled plenary vote was yet to be secured. In 
early 2012, even those closely associated with the opposition did not anticipate the forthcoming 
demonstrations or the associated increase of public interest in the agreement. Considering the then 
recent signing of the agreement on January 26th by the EU and 22 of its Member States, their attention 
was focused on gathering support among MEPs to reject ACTA in the deciding vote. (Interview (MEP), 
2013) (Interview (Associated Expert), 2013)
Proponents also focused on MEPs from the start, assuming that the Council of the European Union was 
unlikely to oppose the agreement, considering the involvement of Member States in the negotiations. 
At that time, most observers would have predicted ACTA’s eventual ratification in the EP but not 
because of unchallenged argumentative supremacy. Rather, most MEPs were either uninterested or too 
preoccupied with their own portfolio to deal with an agreement of apparently little legal consequence. 
(Interview (MEP), 2013)
This only changed when the February 2012 protests introduced ACTA to the mainstream public. MEPs 
were quick to pick up on these developments and in turn investigated the agreement. Protesters 
demanded the rejection of the agreement from the outset and public opinion seemed to confirm a 
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general sentiment against ACTA over the following days. Additionally, the flood of protest letters and 
emails directed at the EP and in a lot of cases at parliamentarians personally, fostered the perception 
that opposing ACTA might be easier than supporting it. Especially MEPs, as elected representatives, 
were thus quickly convinced not to go against their respective electorates. It was suggested that, 
comparing the result of the final vote to the predictions before the protests, public pressure might have 
antedated quite a few voting decisions yet the extent of such alleged opportunism remains speculative. 
This is not to discredit the work or justification of ACTA critics but implies that, despite prior 
knowledge of the agreement, a significant number of MEPs and other experts had yet to determine their 
position thereon when the February 2012 protests occurred. (Interview (MEP), 2013)
A main characteristic of the expert discourse was the identification of copyrights as ACTA's underlying 
core issue. Given the technical developments, there was a widespread belief that a reform of copyright 
protection and enforcement remained necessary. The envisioned provisions of such modifications 
varied of course, without a clear favorite emerging. Still, most included the establishment of a 
minimum legal standard across the EU, in principle similar to ACTA. The problem then was not the 
idea of regulation itself, but its execution. Nobody doubted that the agreement would have been ratified 
if not for the internet chapter. Earlier cases4 had already established how sensitive net policy issues 
could become. Proponents were thus prepared for an argument but the February 2012 protests and 
subsequent critiques exceeded their expectations. Still, they remained dedicated to champion the 
agreement. All else aside, it did represent years of work. They felt that not preparing a defense would 
mean to simply dispatch it due to populist agitation instead of objective discussion, thereby capitulating 
to political opportunism. (Interview (EC Official), 2013)
However, such conviction proved disadvantageous due to public preconception in this case, which 
diminished prospects for a factual public debate when arguing in favor of the agreement. This supports 
the perception that, while the February 2012 protests came as a surprise for both ACTA proponents and 
opponents in Brussels, they predetermined the outcome of the public debate. The initial negative 
impression continued to dominate the public attitude, decisively impairing any defense of ACTA in 
public discourse by negating the possibility for an unbiased discussion thereof. (Interview (Associated 
Expert), 2013)
                                                
4 Such as the controversial Software Patents Directive which was, after a long debate, eventually rejected by the EP in 2005. 
(Buck, 2005)
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In the face of such resistance, most experts concluded that this specific agreement was not sustainable. 
Instead they started to debate how best to address the underlying principle (i.e. copyrights) in an 
eventually forthcoming new approach. Separating the agreement from the issue in this way implied its 
redundancy thereby increasing the likelihood of its rejection. Yet on the other hand, it enabled a defense 
of copyrights which sidestepped the heated popular attitude towards ACTA. (Interview (Associated 
Expert), 2013) The resulting isolation of proponents, who focused on the actual proposal rather than the 
principle, strained relationships between the institutions, at times even on a personal level, hardening 
resolve on both sides. Supporters and opponents alike identified certain aspects of subjectivity in each 
other’s argumentation, which neither assessed as justified. (Interview (Associated Expert), 2013) 
(Interview (EC Official), 2013) (Interview (MEP), 2013)
To remain impartial, this aspect will not be evaluated further but goes to show to what extent the 
conduct of the public discourse informed the content and the conduct of the expert discourse, especially 
at the beginning, in this case. 
6.2 Expert Discourse Conclusions
The analysis of the expert discourse showed how accurate their perception of the public debate was. 
Identifying the key points of the dominating opposition movement, the Brussels-based decision-makers 
and other officials quickly strived to reclaim the discussion. By focusing on the underlying principle of 
copyrights, while implicitly acknowledging the envisioned defeat of ACTA in the plenary vote, they 
succeeded in appropriating a part of the argument for expert discussion. As the public continued to 
focus on the agreement itself, experts, including party politicians at local, national and EU level, gladly 
utilized the debate on copyrights. Not challenging the principle, there seemed to be little popular 
interest in the technicalities of this inherently complex aspect . In other words, believing that the 
popular engagement against ACTA had succeeded in introducing and establishing popular discontent 
with current expert approaches to copyright enforcement, the public appeared confident that the details 
of associated reforms could be left to the experts. That almost all of them seemed to support the 
popular rejection of the agreement probably reinforced this perception. (Interview (Associated Expert), 
2013)
This is where the aforementioned simplicity of the public discourse aggravated its remote impact. 
Without prior efforts to enlarge the common basis among the protest movement beyond the rejection of 
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the agreement, it was difficult to transfer the existing disposition to other aspects. The prevailing 
perception was that the demonstrations had forced the experts to grant public access to the ACTA 
debate. Its conduct had seemingly adapted to the combination of digital and physical action. These two 
were nevertheless circumstantial. They applied only until its content, predefined from the start, had 
been addressed. As most opponents appeared uninterested in pursuing the matter further (i.e. past the 
plenary vote) this limitation never occurred to them, which is believed to have been the point. By 
moderately conceding the most pressing popular demands, experts actually facilitated if not 
predetermined what the content of the debate would be. Assured that the discussion would be decided 
within the established political structures, the admission of other participants and forms of conduct was 
not a risk in any way. The perceived compliance of experts to address popular concerns in turn enabled 
them to slowly convert the prominence of the public and the expert discourse over time. The changed 
relation between the two, introduced through the February protests, was thus reversed. By emphasizing 
the debate on principle, experts accommodated a non-parliamentarian movement into the existing 
legislative procedure without actually modifying the process. Offering little resistance in a potentially 
heated debate also reinforced the existing political structures. Either because popular concerns were 
addressed, demonstrating democratic control over political decision-making processes, or because the 
institutional status quo was conserved, preserving the pre-existing arrangement of experts. This is not 
to say that opposition to ACTA was not justified or serious, but considering the actual impact on the 
organizational structure of the EU, defeating the agreement achieved little else. While perhaps the 
intended objective, the problem remains that without further public input, these existing structures will 
most likely reproduce similar solutions to the same principles. (Interview (Associated Expert), 2013) 
(Interview (MEP), 2013)
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7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Predicting Protests
Throughout this analysis, the February 2012 protests against ACTA have been identified as the linchpin 
of the debate. Yet very little information regarding its exact origin has been found and the available 
explanations were mostly unsatisfactory. (Heidtmann, 2012)
Chronologically speaking, the Polish protest movement spearheaded what would later develop into 
European demonstrations. Attempts by the state to regulate the internet tended to be perceived 
suspiciously, for historical reasons alone. The Polish internet community remains particularly strong 
and had long since championed a free and uncensored world wide web. The turnout at the protests 
despite the cold of the Polish winter further underlined the special status of net policy and the public 
interest it attracted there. (Arthur, 2012(c)) 
Demonstrators were surely motivated by a number of factors, including pre-existing political attitude, 
contemporary media coverage, individual understanding of the agreement and a number of other 
national and European characteristics. Regardless of individual attitude towards the agreement, the 
public display of resentment in this way initially puzzled opponents and proponents alike. Thus, 
chronicling localized developments might be more feasible than a universal explanation. (Klimova, 
2009)
Even if such national narratives might suffice, explaining a European origin of the protests might not 
be possible with less than complex theories. Attributing the protest movement to a somewhat 
incomprehensible spontaneous occurrence, while surely simplifying the matter, might thus be 
acceptable here. It might also partly clarify why no definite overall leadership emerged over time, 
despite the utility a successful appropriation of the movement would have implied for any organization 
or party. (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004)
One has to wonder whether this analytical deficiency is actually disadvantageous. Assuming a definite 
catalyst is known, it would surely either be utilized to address or to side-step demonstrations. For 
example, when evaluating the ACTA case retrospectively, one might argue that more targeted 
information campaigns, designed to preemptively appease citizens’ concerns, or more transparent and 
inclusive negotiations, incorporating citizens’ concerns would have ensured the ratification of the 
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agreement. Regardless of individual attitude thereto, both imply that protests as such are considered a 
nuisance, a disruption to the political decision-making process. Consequently, avoiding them would 
further facilitate political decision-making processes within the established political networks, arguably 
serving public interest best. (Gauthier, 1993)
On the other hand, protests do constitute a tool to express public sentiment outside of contemporary 
structures. In that capacity, they are supposed to be disruptive and unpredictable as long as they remain 
reasonable. Whether they confirm or upset current political prioritization in the process is relevant only 
insofar as it affects the accommodation of their demands. (Hardin, 1993)
This is believed to be one of the key points of this debate: the variable evaluation of the February 2012 
protests by different participants. That they were crucial in opening the expert discourse on ACTA to 
the mainstream public has already been established. Equally important however is the effect their 
assessment will have on both subsequent related discussions and the lasting reputation of non-
parliamentary activism as a whole. So, the following analysis is not interested in discovering the true 
reason for the demonstrations. Rather it focuses on detailing the peculiarities of this discourse to outline 
both its apparent and hidden potential effects. (Potter, 1996)
7.2 The Absence of Supporters
One of the most puzzling aspects has been the apparent absence of vocal ACTA proponents in the 
public discourse. The initial impression of widespread public resentment against ACTA has been 
continuously reinforced by the almost unchanged representation of its proponents. While, for example, 
representatives of major political parties gradually joined the discussion to oppose the agreement, no 
such influx has been observed on the supporting side. One might argue that such behavior constituted 
political opportunism. Aiming to benefit from the debate in the future, politicians might be very eager 
to position themselves on the winning side. (Küchemann, 2012(c)) Yet if ACTA was inherently as bad 
as some protesters charged, why was it signed by so many Member States? Conspiracy theories aside, 
the explanation that industry lobbyists simply succeeded in coaxing elected ministers and experienced 
EU officials into accepting an agreement without knowing its content is highly questionable. Even if 
somewhat correct, where were its supporters, be they political or industry lobbyists, from February 
2012 onwards? If the agreement was indeed as crucial as either side claimed, why did it fail to mobilize 
corresponding support in the public discourse? 
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The different aspects of these questions are going to be addressed in turn, yet it is believed that once 
again, the protests are essential to the answer. 
First of all, arguing in favor of ACTA was difficult from the start, as outlined before. The initial 
mainstream introduction of the topic was hostile, putting proponents on the defensive. Additionally, the 
inherent contradiction of its premise, namely that the agreement was vital to the EU economy yet did 
not require any changes in the current acquis, was difficult to rationalize. The explanation offered (i.e.
that it would create a fallback position, a minimum level of protection for copyrights) showcased that 
the agreement was essentially an expert project, having been drafted, negotiated and finalized by 
experts for the evaluation of other experts. That it thus presumed a specific knowledge in evaluators 
certainly impaired its appeal to the mainstream public. (McHoul & Rapley, 2001) Depending on 
participants’ ability to abstract, an argumentation based on practical examples tends to appear more 
convincing than a position utilizing theoretical examples. They are easier presentable as objective while 
arguments on principle might be more prone to rely on corresponding individual interpretation. 
Remaining focused on experts, especially the MEPs, proponents also aimed to ensure that any critique 
of ACTA viable in these circles would have to be based on the actual text. This already restrained some 
of the wilder accusations present in the public debate. There, outdated information was sometimes 
taken at face value (e.g. when critiquing the alleged inclusion of the so-called 3-strikes-rule, which had 
been deleted from the final text a year earlier). (Meyer, 2012) Actions such as the referral of ACTA to 
the ECJ, intended to dispel concern of experts, namely that the agreement might not conform to the EU 
acquis, tended to achieve the opposite. A confirmation of their respective interpretation by the Court 
would have been a major boon either to opponents or proponents. The disruption of the ongoing public 
debate in the meantime however, was easily portrayed as the actual reason for this belated referral. An 
arguably obvious approach, if successful, might have reset the conditions to before the public protests. 
Not only would it have been difficult to sustain the current popularity, thus ensuring access to the 
debate. It would have also implied a change in conduct as the ruling of the Court, as the highest legal 
authority, would have had to be respected, possibly foreclosing certain aspects of argumentation. A 
decision not to wait for the ruling was complicated by the implied dismissal of the Court’s opinion on 
the matter. This was the subject of a brief discussion within the EP, which showcased how well timed 
the referral to the ECJ was, if a delay of the vote was the intention. In the end, the vote was not 
postponed, confirming that conformity to the EU acquis was not the only substantial concern. 
(Küchemann, 2012(c)) Ironically, the parliamentarian opposition had tried to refer ACTA to the ECJ 
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themselves some time before, assuming that the Court would agree with their point of view. Yet 
changing their approach to lobby for a rejection of the agreement in the plenary at the beginning of 
2012 instead, proved to be more successful. (Interview (Associated Expert), 2013)
Secondly, its initial target audience was split between elected and appointed experts who were 
susceptible to popular opinion in different ways. This is not to suggest that once the protests started 
every expert simply dismissed the agreement. Rather, the original conduct of some of them initiated a 
sequence which led to the impression that the EC remained the sole defender of the agreement. Under 
the impression of the public protests, national politicians, for example in Poland and Germany, were 
quick to stall or even retract their commitments to the agreement. (Bernau, 2012) Naturally, this came 
as a huge surprise to the EC which had negotiated ACTA on behalf and in the presence of some of these 
politicians. Yet it could hardly be expected that they would therefore abandon years of hard work on an 
issue they believed to be of vital importance for the future of the EU economy. Hence representatives 
of the EC were determined in their defense of the agreement. (Interview (EC Official), 2013) This 
dedication arguably motivated some of the statements which were all but understanding of the public 
protests (i.e. Commissioner De Gucht’s aforementioned suggestion to MEPs). (Knop, 2012(a)) That 
this would damage their reputation among protesters was apparently deemed acceptable, reinforcing
the perception that the main focus of supporters remained on swaying MEPs who would actually be 
voting on the proposal, instead of the public. 
While somewhat logical, this attitude made it difficult for other experts, who might have endorsed the 
agreement in principle otherwise, to publicly pledge their support, lest they would incur similar public 
hostility. It needs to be remembered that this includes experts who were not necessarily EU officials 
themselves and were usually only partially involved in its decision-making processes, conditioned by 
their specialization. Depending on their background (e.g. as an industry expert or prominent researcher, 
etc.), their position might have suffered more from bad publicity than those of appointed EU officials. 
(Interview (Associated Expert), 2013) This is not to say that EU officials do not care about their public
image. On the contrary, MEPs and elected EU officials might consider very carefully going openly 
against strong public opinion. Yet the argument remains that experts outside the EU institutions will be 
less inclined to risk their position by expressing unpopular views without good reason. Since the 
protests increased the publicity of the debate and subsequent public scrutiny to unprecedented levels, 
these experts tended to restrict themselves to arguing the underlying principle of the discussion: 
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copyrights. This way, they were able to keep themselves involved in the overall discussion while 
avoiding its emotionally charged aspects. (Interview (Associated Expert), 2013)
Thirdly, and probably most importantly, it was not necessary to defend ACTA for most proponents. Not 
because newspapers were quick to pronounce it dead after the February protests or because the 
oppositions' argumentation could not be challenged. Rather, defending the agreement had become 
obsolete due to the limited scope of the protests. The demonstrations were utilized as a non-
parliamentarian way to attract the attention of policy makers to public concerns over the issue. The 
opposition movement plainly defined the rejection of ACTA as its only common agenda. (Höll, 
2012(b)) That they focused on convincing MEPs of their position implied that protesters acknowledged 
the authority of the EP within the existing decision-making process. This approach ultimately proved 
effective because it cleverly exploited the current political structure, in which elected officials might be 
more inclined to carefully consider popular demands. Their seemingly uncompromising stance on very 
limited common demands (i.e. to reject ACTA) served to reinforce their argumentative position. Not 
because of rhetorical superiority but because it raised decision-makers’ potential opportunity costs 
associated with ignoring it. (Hardin, 1993)
As outlined above, apart from the EC, potential proponents were less inclined to openly support the 
agreement or criticize the opposition. To them, ACTA was important only insofar as it could be utilized 
to settle the underlying issue of copyrights. Additionally, the voiced concerns mostly applied to the 
relatively small internet chapter. Such focus implied that the paragraphs regarding physical goods, 
which constituted the majority of the agreement, were not actually problematic. Realizing that the 
importance of copyrights would not be fundamentally challenged by protesters, experts could assuredly 
assume that this issue would be back on the agenda, irrespective of the outcome of this particular 
debate. Being eventually involved in that process, the priority shifted towards securing the individual 
expert status for the time being. So experts had to ask themselves: why should ACTA be publicly
defended? Given the then prevailing mood and palpable hostility towards the agreement, such a step 
might have tarnished one’s public reputation beyond the current debate, whether or not the proposal 
would be ratified as a result. (Amann, 2012) (Klimova, 2009)
On the other hand, only participating in the principal part of the debate, again involving mostly experts, 
might have been more prudent to preserving one's current position. Additionally, the overall 
formulation of the agreement provided ample opportunity for comments. The, at times, vague wording 
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for example enabled even those experts who strived to appear more differentiated than others to 
critique the lack of legal certainty. The call for a new, more inclusive approach to discuss copyrights 
could also be securely voiced. This was especially relevant in this case where the overall opposition 
seemed neither able nor interested in providing a commonly agreed upon viable substitute for ACTA. 
Without a readily available alternative, the principal discussion on how to reform the copyright system 
continued with the same core of experts, not relevantly changing the pre-existing discursive practice.
(Knop, 2012(b))
7.3 Winning is not Winning
In this regard the attitude of the opposition became problematic. Simply winning a discussion without 
establishing its subsequent evaluation might undo the initial achievement. The rejection of ACTA for 
example could be attributed either to concerns regarding its conduct (e.g. insufficient transparency 
during the negotiations) or its content (e.g. the sensitivity associated with regulating net policy). While 
both aspects were important in this case, it is believed that the conduct of the debate was more crucial 
to the outcome. Yet does that conversely mean that, if it had been negotiated openly, it would not have 
sparked the protests? Even more important, how are future proposals supposed to address concerns 
which have not been clearly defined? (Bevir, 2010)
To be sure, defeating ACTA was a major accomplishment in its own right, but it should not be 
overestimated. The apparently self-imposed limitation in scope mentioned earlier, not only facilitated 
its mass appeal but also antedated the at times populist argumentation it utilized. Not due to malignant 
intentions but because the inherent complexity of reforming copyrights necessitated a simplified focus 
during the popular debate. (Klimova, 2009) To raise this level might in turn have devalued the current 
achievement, as a continuation would imply that it did not suffice. Given the emotional connection 
many people felt to this case, this might have been extremely difficult to achieve. 
Still, emphasizing this victory runs in danger of misinterpreting the value of such an approach. Or in 
other words, while political decision-makers might be impressed by a display of public protest against a 
proposal without much political consequence, they might not be as effectively swayed on more 
substantial issues. Depending on the matter, political decision-makers might not be influenced even by 
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extreme public pressure as can be observed in a number of cases. These include the popular 
environmentalist movements against nuclear power or peace movements against involvement in Iraq in 
Germany and the UK, respectively. These and other instances showcased that protests alone are mainly 
a tool to attract public attention. They still require to be translated into discursive power at the level of 
decision-makers. To this end, it remains necessary to conform to the existing political structures unless 
they themselves are challenged. Simplifying an argument might be effective to ensure mass appeal, but 
tends to reduce its viability in expert discourses. Yet this is where most political decision are taken, at 
least in contemporary democratic systems. (Sunstein, 1993)
So when evaluating the ACTA case, it is essential to remember that public protests cannot substitute 
debates on principles, even if successful. On the contrary, prioritizing popularity over substance will 
certainly impede the accommodation of whatever alternatives might be suggested. This is not to say 
that only expert discourses are able to contribute to political processes. Rather, a discussion should 
provide for the complexity of a given matter regardless of the setting. After all, democratic decision-
making processes require effort from both policy makers and the electorate. This includes incorporating 
the intricacies of the manipulation of discourse, such as apprehending the effect of seemingly unrelated 
actions. Considering how central political discourse is to contemporary decision-making processes, the 
knowledge of the different ways how a debate can be influenced consciously or subconsciously is a 
minimum requirement. If not to apply them oneself, then at least to recognize it when others do, to 
react accordingly. Ironically, to effectively change this situation would necessitate winning a debate on 
principle first with exact those methods. (Bevir, 2010) 
7.4 Digital vs. Analogue Influence
The progressing technical developments in recent years have facilitated the transfer of personal and 
societal interaction to the internet. A corresponding recognition of its political potential however has 
been slow to materialize. Its greatest weakness regarding political legitimacy simultaneously 
constitutes one of its biggest advantages: the facilitation of communication. The ease of largely 
anonymous access to the web is the key issue here. Without accessible and reliable mechanisms to 
verify information disseminated there, online material remains prone to willful or random falsification 
acknowledged by the persisting basic skepticism to online material. (Waters, 2012)
The resulting political devaluation of online debates is believed to have been essential in the 
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development of an independent awareness of the internet community. Given the legal challenges a 
borderless internet posed to traditional regulatory efforts, web users established their own ideals 
guiding its development (e.g. net neutrality). The prevailing political disregard for online culture 
further facilitated the impression that the internet community would have to organize itself. The mutual 
understanding appeared to be that traditional politics and net policy would not interfere with each other. 
Yet in light of SOPA/PIPA and ACTA, this regulatory equilibrium became increasingly challenged. 
These recent regulatory clashes signaled that societal developments would eventually necessitate a 
rapprochement of the digital and the physical realms, despite their individual preferences. (Mueller, 
2002) In the course of this development, their mutual relation will certainly be redefined based on their 
respective significance in pioneering debates such as ACTA. 
After all, a novel feature of this debate was how the combination of digital (i.e. online debates, hacker 
actions, etc.) and physical activities (i.e. demonstrations, public debates, etc.) promoted the opposition 
movement. Evaluating the reasons for their success unearthed an interesting challenge regarding the 
necessity to accommodate new forms of protest in existing discursive structures. While digital actions 
were important in raising awareness in the first place and subsequently retaining public attention, both 
sides emphasized that only physical debates would be acceptable to address these issues. (Küchemann, 
2012(a))
2012 has been somewhat of a breakout year for effective internet activism. While not disputing the 
success of earlier efforts, it oversaw the defeat of SOPA/PIPA and ACTA and witnessed the continuing 
promotion of net policy on the political agenda. (Pignal & Cienski, 2012) The intermittent success of 
parties like the German Pirates, who mainly focus on internet issues, suggested that the transfer of 
political processes to the digital world might, partly at least, constitute a lasting trend. The enduring 
association if not equation of the internet community with younger citizens further reinforced the 
potential for increasing emphasis on online activity in political processes. (Anduiza, James & Jorba, 
2012) However, in the current structures such a change seems unlikely. While the simplicity to connect 
online arguably lowers the participation threshold, the resulting action usually remains restricted to the 
internet. The European-wide protests against ACTA for example were preceded and accompanied by 
considerable digital commotion. For example, the hacker attacks where only retroactively legitimized 
through the expressed public support for their motivation. Yet their effect on the political process 
depended almost exclusively on the actual turnout. So overall, the physical manifestations secured 
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popular and expert attention. (Pignal & Cienski, 2012) Most of the online debates continued to be 
disregarded, showcasing the persisting skepticism towards internet discussions and the established 
authority of traditional venues of discourse. (Küchemann, 2012(a))
The point here would be that in this reciprocal relationship which might have suggested equality, the 
physical manifestations were certainly more important to influence the discourses. They introduced the 
topic to the mainstream, they showcased the extent of public discontent to experts and they created an 
impression of European public unity on the issue. So, the demonstrations were necessary to prioritize 
their concerns on the political agenda. Selectively emphasizing the online movement in addition thereto 
increased the perceived public interest in the topic. While the physical manifestations provided the 
required political relevance, the digital exchanges were essential in conveying their continued presence. 
In other words, the digital buzz created through individual actions of ACTA opponents facilitated the 
impression that their movement was far larger than the actual turnout suggested. (Miller, 2011)
When evaluating the ACTA debate it is of paramount importance to point out this difference. The main 
problem here would be that digital support cannot simply be equated with physical support. For 
example, the millions of digital signatures on AVAAZ5 against ACTA did not translate into as many 
active protesters on the streets. While it might seem easy to express support for a given campaign 
online (e.g. liking something on social networks, following a blogger, uploading a home video, etc.), 
inverting this process requires much more effort. For ACTA this meant that reasons to get involved 
online should not be assumed to be purely political. That is not to say that only bored web surfers 
supported the opposition movement but rather that the skepticism towards online interaction will 
continue to restrain its equation with real-world participation. (Küchemann, 2012(a)) This point has to 
be emphasized to prevent disappointment based on the impression that internet action could eventually 
replace analogue engagement. Additionally it might create false expectations as to the effort required to 
influence political processes and in turn the effectiveness of such involvement. (Gauthier, 1993)
Establishing for example a new forum for debate or form of political action will only succeed if its 
supremacy over existing structures is established through discourse. If this necessity is ignored, then 
subsequent failures to influence political decision-making processes as imagined might discourage 
future commitments. Regardless of perception, the defeat of ACTA was neither easy nor predetermined 
                                                
5 A global online activist network which, amongst others, collects digital signatures to petition politicians. (Pilkinton, 2012)
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but an intensive contest. Establishing a difference in effectiveness between digital and analogue efforts 
is not intended to devalue either of them. Yet the study on hand showcased how deeply embedded the 
exclusive authority of traditional negotiation remained despite growing digitalization. (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 2005)
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8 CONCLUSIONS
The ongoing evaluation of the ACTA discussion will eventually establish a dominating reading thereof. 
Although it initiated a necessary debate on the principle of copyrights, the way in which it illustrated 
the evolution of discourse is believed to be its most interesting aspect. After the decline of conscious in 
favor of subconscious manipulation and the specialization of discourse and its participants, this case 
showcased a viable alternative in the continuing development of discourse: namely its negligence, 
under specific circumstances. Rather than vesting effort in influencing the access, conduct and content 
of a seemingly predetermined discourse, a more passive approach might suffice. (Ashenden, 2005) This 
is believed to constitute a development of discourse. Similar to though-terminating clichés, such an 
approach would constitute a novel way to forego the established discursive structures while still 
achieving subconscious discursive hegemony. It thus remains vital to be alert for such subtle changes to 
the status quo to consciously face them.
As outlined in the ACTA case, it appears to be most applicable when the following conditions are met:
First of all, the result of the debate should appear decided in advance, thus rendering the need for 
conventional manipulation obsolete or disproportionately complex. (Amann & Ankenbrand, 2012)
Secondly, the scope of the opposition should be limited to the immediate issue, not disputing the 
underlying principle, implicitly limiting the future impact of the discourse result. (Stuart, 2001)
If these two conditions are met, the point would be to forego winning the discourse by not participating 
in it at all. Rather than arguing on the losing side, it might be more useful to side-step heated debates of 
limited relevance. This would not only preserve resources, including reputation, which could be better 
utilized in other discussions. It might also tempt the opposition to rationalize their unquestioned 
success with innate argumentative superiority. After all, cognitive dissonance is even less likely when 
evaluating a dominantly successful argument. The resulting familiarization to a lower argumentative 
standard and implied underestimation of the opposing capabilities might subsequently be exploited in 
future discussions. To prevent these and similar subconscious manipulations it remains necessary to 
continuously evaluate both the opposing and one's own argument in any given discussion critically. 
After all, engagement in discourse requires effort from all participants. The potential consequences, 
especially of political debates, ensure that such effort will be maximized by all sides whenever 
possible. So, encountering only token resistance in a supposedly important discourse should evoke 
suspicion rather than confidence. (McHoul & Rapley, 2001)
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In conclusion, it is believed that profound political change can only be achieved through debates on 
principle. The example of ACTA showcased how little consequence even a decisive result in discourse 
can have, beyond the immediate issue, if the underlying principle is not addressed. This has nothing to 
do with individual engagement or commitment but is structurally conditioned. Forthcoming legislative 
proposals are the product of the existing political configuration which in turn is based on facts 
established in previous debates on principle. Simply rejecting this output without communicating what 
alternative would be acceptable will not improve decision-making processes in the future. Instead, it is 
more likely that similar content will be reproduced, especially since neither the responsible process nor 
the involved agents are provided with a sufficient basis upon which to model possible adaptations.
(Connolly, 1993) The problem here is not the number of suggestions but insufficient public engagement 
in the principal debate. Defeating ACTA was only the first step. Mystifying this achievement might be 
utilized to legitimize personal indifference in other instances. Yet democratic policy making processes 
depend on continuous participation, not one-off displays of outrage. That the development of suitable 
alternatives will be difficult and time consuming is undisputed. One has only to decide whether or not 
the reform of the principle of copyrights is worth the effort and act accordingly. (Potter, 1996) 
(Foucault, 1982)
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IV ANNEX
The interviews were based on the following questions:
1: What is your current position and what was your position within the EU during the ACTA debate 
(defined here as lasting from October 2011 to October 2012)? 
2: How did you first hear of ACTA? What was your main source of information regarding ACTA?
3: Did you or any other politician/colleague as far as you know, anticipate the public backlash/interest 
in ACTA? Why or why not? 
4: In your opinion, what was the main reason for ACTA's political defeat/failure, if applicable?
5: In hindsight, would you change anything (e.g. your conduct or argumentation) in the ACTA debate? 
6: In hindsight, if you would have had to endorse ACTA, what would you have done to ensure its 
success? 
7: In your opinion, what effects, if any, did the ACTA debate have on the political decision-making 
process within the EU?
